Fusion Centers


Fusion Centers

Following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent reform of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies, the Department of Homeland Security created fusion centers throughout the country in order to facilitate information sharing for tribal, local, state, and federal government agencies (Khan, 2012). According to Khan (2012), the centers “have ‘not produced useful intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts’ and have ‘too often wasted money and stepped on American civil liberties’” (Khan, 2012). However, these figures and statements should be corroborated with the multiple intelligence overseeing committees within the Senate and Congress to inform the public of the real information at hand. Yet, Senator Levin states that these centers “’may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism’ like criminal investigations, public safety or disaster response” (Khan, 2012). Overall, these centers have access to classified information and when other analysts upload their products and reports in SIPR and JWICS systems, then it enables others to search through these products through on the classified systems.

Intelligence Reform

The National Security Act of 1947 established different agencies and positions regarding the military and intelligence community. Throughout the years, different policies and laws have been enacted to ensure that intelligence agencies follow established procedures and all laws so they do not run into issues or violate these laws. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was signed and “is the most recent legislative action to reform the community’s performance and management. While the IRTPA has contributed to intelligence improvements, such as increased sharing of data on terrorism, most in and around the intelligence community would assert that managing the intelligence enterprise is still a work in progress” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). National intelligence managers were created in order to facilitate integration of “intelligence strategies that support national security outcomes” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). Another significant change is that the person holding the position of the Director of National Intelligence keep an important relationship with the President due to the President being a consumer of intelligence (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012).

Three Philosophical Lessons

There are 3 philosophical lessons concerning intelligence that include Simpson’s Paradox, Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory, and Casual Inference. Simpson’s Paradox “has immediate consequences for the development of optimal strategies for the sharing of data, and for the targeted deployment of intelligence-gathering resources” (Mole, 2012). Overall, it is best to share the data different entities have to be able to better plan and coordinate efforts to where it is most likely to get the best out of. Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory deals with understanding the differences between resiliency and reliability. It is easy to confuse both and it makes it harder for an analyst to better rate a source’s reliability due to noisy information. Casual Inference is (in a way) applying mathematics to better gain an understanding of is most likely occurring and be able to validate which theory, solution, etc. would work best.


Khan, A. (2012). Senate report: Massive post-9/11 surveillance apparatus a “waste”. Retrieved from

Strickland, F. & Whitlock, C. (2012). The next four years: Intelligence Community reform refining, not rebooting. Forum Governing in the Next Four Years. Winter 2012. PDF.

Mole, C. (2012). Three Philosophical Lessons for the Analysis of Criminal and Military Intelligence. Intelligence & National Security, 27(4), 441–458.

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